At a time when developing and emerging countries are becoming more interested in adopting formal inflation targets, it may be useful to review the experience of 
Analytical framework
It is convenient to distinguish between three types of monetary architecture, based on the financial infrastructure required and the monetary policy strategies which are then possible.
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At one end of a continuous spectrum we can define a 'basic' monetary architecture, in which there are few or no banks and no organised financial markets, and the monetary authority has only minimal expertise. In such a monetary architecture all the monetary authority can do is to buy and sell foreign for domestic currency, that is to operate a fixed exchange rate, which functions as a substitute for a monetary policy. This is the sort of architecture found in many former colonies in their immediate postindependence periods, and in some countries that were never formal colonies, such as the small Gulf countries in the 1950s and 1960s.
At the other end of the spectrum there is what can be called a 'modern' monetary architecture, in which the banking system is large and well-established, there are substantial organised markets in bonds and money and the central bank has a high level both of independence from political pressure and of technical expertise. Here the money market, in which the commercial banks are continuously lending and borrowing to and from each other as well as the central bank, acts to transmit changes in the central bank's policy interest rate fully and directly to the interest rates set by the commercial banks. Monetary growth is insulated from fiscal deficits (except perhaps those which are extraordinarily large) by the existence of a bond market which enables the government to borrow from the non-bank private sector instead of the banking system. The central bank is therefore able to operate an interest rate-based policy on a continuous discretionary basis, and it can pursue a formal or informal inflation target, or even an exchange rate target (for which its main instrument would be the interest rate rather than foreign exchange market interventions). 2 Countries with this type of architecture include the US, the euro area countries and the UK.
It is also useful to define an average 'intermediate' type of monetary architecture, between these two ends of the continuous spectrum, in which there is a substantial banking system and some kind of a bond market, though no real money market, and the central bank has some ability to formulate and implement monetary policy.
However, the lack of an active money market means that the central bank's policy rate is not transmitted fully or immediately through to the commercial banks' operations, 3 so that monetary policy has to be implemented mainly through other instruments such as reserve requirements and credit controls. The bond market is not sufficiently active, or the involvement of the non-bank private sector substantial enough, for monetary growth to be securely insulated from fiscal deficits. were publicly announced targets for the growth of (initially broader but later sometimes narrower) measures of the money stock, usually for the coming year but later sometimes for periods of several years, typically expressed as target ranges rather than points. As Lane (1985) has argued, the introduction of such targets was not seen by central bankers as a move towards a Friedmanite monetary rule, or as a precommitment within the time-inconsistency perspective (which was only just beginning to be developed); nor were they seen as commitments to precise short-run monetary control. So why were they introduced? The monetary authorities (including the politicians, since at this time developed country central banks were mostly not very independent) had realised that under high and variable inflation it was difficult to manipulate real interest rates; and they believed that pre-announced targets might stabilise the economic environment and so contribute to growth, but also might have some independent effect on inflation expectations and hence on the unemployment cost of disinflation. There was also some limited idea that targets would improve the credibility of official policies, as monetary authorities must be serious if they were willing to declare in advance a standard by which they could be assessed. 4 More broadly the introduction of monetary targets should be regarded as a delayed response to the ending of the Bretton Woods system and as an attempt to provide an alternative nominal anchor to the dollar peg.
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The record of monetary targets is somewhat mixed. The period over which they were operated witnessed more or less successful disinflations in most of the developed countries, particularly after the second oil price shock of late 1979, to which countries responded in a much 'tougher' manner than the first. M3 until 2000) . The basic rationale given was that the processes of innovation and structural change in the financial sector meant that the demand for money had become so unpredictable that precise control of the money stock was no longer feasible: 7 if there is no stable relationship between the money stock and the final objective (eg nominal income), then hitting the monetary target may mean not hitting the target for the final objective, and the monetary target will be neither a useful signal of the authorities' intentions nor a good benchmark for assessing performance. However, little hard evidence was adduced to support this argument and for the UK at least it seems that the velocity of money was no more unpredictable in the 1980s than it had been before, 8 so that if monetary targets were not justified in the mid-1980s they were not justified before that either.
A more important reason for rejection of monetary targets may have been the growing conviction that the monetary authorities (given the financial liberalisation that had taken and/or was taking place) no longer had effective instruments to control the money supply: they could intervene in the money and bond markets (which had long been well-established in London and New York and developed elsewhere in the 1980s), but the effect of such interventions on the monetary aggregates was imprecise and variable. This was commonly understood in terms of Keynesian-monetarist debates where Tobin (1963) had argued that money 'supply' was determined within the financial system via a complex set of interactions between banks and other agents, while Friedmanite monetary base control was not viable (see Goodhart, 1991 Goodhart, , 1994 .
In the UK monetary targeting had relied heavily on the technique of 'overfunding', in which the government sold more debt than its deficit in order to offset the effect on broad money of the high level of (liberalised) bank lending. However, this was decisive. These reforms covered public debt management, the issuance of government paper, the secondary market for government paper, the money market and the settlement system, and capital controls (Passacantando, 1996) . In particular, the Treasury ceased to set a floor price for its auctions, settlement was dematerialised and longer maturities were introduced, a screen-based interbank deposit market was established which significantly improved liquidity and activity in the money market, and capital controls were dismantled (Passacantando, 1996; Cobham, Cosci and Mattesini, 2008) . The results were that monetary growth was securely insulated from fiscal policy, and it became possible to operate monetary policy through interest rates, which allowed the credit ceilings to be abolished (though they were temporarily reintroduced in 1986-87). Up to 1992 the main element of the monetary policy framework was the fixed exchange rate within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS), but this was accompanied by a target for M2. 11 After Italy was suspended from the ERM in September 1992 the monetary target continued, together with an inflation target set by the government which was also heavily involved in wage negotiations, but the central bank was able to pursue these targets by a largely interest-rate based policy. Italy rejoined the ERM in 1996, and succeeded in entering EMU from the start (Chiorazzo and Spaventa, 1999 rates began to decline and converge. (Gros and Thygesen, 1998 , chapter 3).
As already indicated, the ERM has been seen as an asymmetric exchange rate system, in which the other countries pegged their currencies to and 'imported credibility' from the larger economy of Germany (which also had the most independent and respected central bank). But it can also be presented as a shock absorber mechanism which enabled member countries to coordinate their macroeconomic policy in response to shocks without an explicit framework for coordination (Fratianni and von Hagen, 1992; Gros and Thygesen, 1998, chapter 4 The ERM suffered a major setback in a series of speculative crises which lasted from early September 1992 to the end of July 1993: the Italian lira and the British pound, which had joined less than two years before, were suspended from the ERM in September 1992 (the lira returned in 1996 but the pound has not), other ERM currencies were devalued over the next nine months (the Irish punt, the Spanish peseta -three times, and the Portuguese escudo -twice) and some Nordic currencies which had been pegging informally to the EMS also had to abandon their pegs. The crisis reached a climax in late July 1993 with massive speculative attacks on the French franc which were ultimately resisted only by a widening of the margins within which ERM parities could fluctuate from 2.25% to 15% (on either side).
This should not be considered a breakdown of the EMS as such, because countries did not use more than a small part of the extra margin allowed, most currencies returned to their central parities within months of the crisis, and most entered EMU (whose attainment was an implicit goal of the EMS) at those central rates. In addition, it has been argued that the causes of the crises lay not in the nature or the design of the system but in specific decisions taken by the monetary authorities concerned. 17 issue is unclear (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995) , and central bankers themselves thought it unimportant (Masciandaro and Spinelli, 1994; Beblavý, 2003) .
There remains considerable debate about the calculation of these indices (Mangano, 1998) and about the direction of causation. For example, it has been argued that German inflation has been low not because the Bundesbank has been independent, but because there has been a social consensus in favour of price stability which has causally affected both inflation and the independence of the Bundesbank. 21 It is also true that the major disinflations in Europe typically preceded rather than followed the increases in CBI. One possible explanation for this is that some central banks may have acquired a great deal of 'informal' or de facto independence well before they attained formal independence (Cobham, Cosci and Mattesini, 2008) . 22 On the other hand, there is some clear evidence that CBI 'matters', for example in the French experience where the statutory independence of the Banque de France was followed in 1995 by a period of sharp pressure from the government which was successfully resisted by the Banque (Elgie and Thompson, 1998: 139-40) .
It is common to associate the growth of central banks' independence with the rise in their 'transparency', that is, their provision of information about past and current decisions and their publication of their forecasts for inflation and GDP growth. 23 It is certainly true that much more information is made available by central banks now than in the 1950s or 1960s. However, it is important to emphasise not just the communication of analysis and forecasts but the ability to make them in the first place. There are no good data on the numbers of economists employed in central banks, but there can be no question that that number has increased enormously.
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Moreover, while as late as the 1970s academic monetary economists tended to look down on economists who worked in central banks as old-fashioned and out of touch with modern economics, by the late 1990s at least it was clear that central banks were recruiting and making use of economists who were operating at the frontiers of research in monetary and macro economics, and academics came increasingly to learn from and work with them.
The European Central Bank, which has set monetary policy for the euro area since 1999, was deliberately established with complete independence. It is also very strong in terms of technical expertise, employing a large number of economists, and publishing a wide range of regular and occasional monetary and financial reports and around 150 discussion papers per annum. The ECB has been accused by some (e.g.
Geraats, 2010) of lacking full transparency compared to central banks like the Federal
Reserve or the Bank of England, but it is possible to take a more favourable view of its transparency (Smets, 2010) .
Inflation targeting
The first country to introduce a formal inflation target (IT) was New Zealand in 1990, but it was quickly followed by Canada in 1991, the UK in 1992, Sweden, Finland, and Australia in 1993, and a range of others thereafter (see Roger, 2010) . The introduction of IT typically followed the failure of the previous monetary policy framework. For example, the UK, Sweden and Finland adopted IT after the collapse of their fixed exchange rates, while Canada, New Zealand and Australia took to IT after periods of discretionary policy (with no clear monetary framework) which were perceived as inefficient and themselves followed the abandonment of monetary targets.
The current monetary policy strategies of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank involve an emphasis on price stability, and some observers classify these countries as informal inflation targeters. Others take the view that IT requires the public announcement of a specific target. 25 An analytical distinction is also commonly made between strict and flexible IT, where the latter but not the former involves a concern with the variability of output as well as with inflation. All known inflation targeters are flexible rather than strict.
The official reasons given in the formal IT countries for the adoption of IT included the need for a nominal anchor and the failure of other anchors (monetary or exchange rate targets); the need for a framework for the accountability of the central bank (which often became more independent at the same time); and the argument that an inflation target provides a clear benchmark and operates as a precommitment in the time-inconsistency sense. It should be noted that the developed countries which opted for formal IT were typically smaller Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian countries from outside the continental European tradition of sound finance referred to above; they were also countries which had experienced problems of poor monetary policy and weak credibility, countries that were 'institutionally challenged' in Orphanides's (2010) felicitous phrase.
Evaluations of the performance of IT are somewhat mixed. The majority view 26 is that inflation targeting has worked well, in terms of keeping inflation low without high output/unemployment variability; and there has been a welcome related improvement in accountability and transparency. In addition, no country that has adopted IT has so far abandoned it (except to enter EMU); and there is some tentative evidence that inflation targeters coped better with the commodity price rises and financial crisis of 2006-9 than non-IT countries. The current majority view also favours the adoption of IT by emerging economies. Carvalho Filho, 2010; Olafsson and Pétursson, 2011) . On the other hand, the UK, the largest IT country, has had a particularly difficult time in the crisis. Moreover, emerging market inflation targeters (but not developed ones) have tended to intervene more strongly in the forex market during the crisis, and in that sense have retreated somewhat from fully-fledged inflation targeting (Stone et al., 2009 ). However, the more important issues here are whether IT (formal and informal) could have contributed to the occurrence of the crisis, and whether IT should now be modified in some way. There is widespread agreement that aspects of banks' behaviour and bank regulation were significant factors leading to the 2007-9 financial crisis, but the crisis has given fresh life to decade-long arguments about monetary policy and asset prices.
The relevant assets are equity, housing and foreign exchange, all of whose prices are historically volatile, with periodic large, long swings. The majority view, articulated by Gertler (1999, 2001 ) was that it is too difficult to identify asset price bubbles and too dangerous to prick them; instead policymakers should just pick up the pieces after/if a bubble bursts. 31 On the other hand, a minority view expressed most clearly by Cecchetti et al. (2000) argued that policy should respond to incipient bubbles so as to limit their development, by 'leaning against the wind' (LATW) (raising interest rates when asset prices seem to be rising too fast, and lowering them when prices are falling too fast).
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One way of putting the argument is this: inflation targeting central bankers typically try to explain their own reaction functions to private agents, in order to keep inflation expectations 'nailed down', 33 and they could try to do the same with asset priceswhere the hope would be that expectations would be held down in such a way that action would have to be taken only rarely. In fact most central bankers in the 2000s
did not attempt to exercise any comparable influence on asset price expectations.
Indeed, the Bernanke and Gertler (1999) 
recommendation (followed in practice by
Greenspan as head of the Federal Reserve) set a floor to asset price expectations, below which prices could not fall, but implied that prices could rise without limit (the so-called Greenspan put). Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the bubble in US housing prices was identifiable when it was happening and would have been smaller if interest rates had been raised earlier (Taylor, 2009) ; and in that case, although -given the flaws in the financial regulatory system -the crisis might not have been avoided, it would have been less sharp and less deep.
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The conventional reply to this view, as presented in Allsopp (2010) wisdom is correct if the targets are independent, but if they are set in relation to each other they may be compatible. In practice the exchange rate targets gradually came to take precedence, and by the late 1980s in any case these countries gave priority to exchange rate targets in case of conflict.
16 Gros and Thygesen (1998, chapter 4) .
17 Mélitz (1994) 19 The evidence for developing countries is much less clear. The standard response to this has been that the rule of law is weaker in developing countries so that statutory independence is not a good measure of de facto independence, and Cukierman, Webb and Neyaptı (1992) and others have managed to retrieve the relationships between CBI and inflation/growth by using the turnover rate for central bank governors as an alternative measure of actual independence.
20 See Cobham, Cosci and Mattesini (2008) for an assessment of the changes to the formal CBI of France, Italy and the UK in the 1990s in terms of the Grilli et al (1991) and Cukierman (1992) indices. 21 See, for example, Hayo (1998 ), and Posen (1993 Schmidt-Hebbel (2010) and Petursson (2010) . 27 See Roger( 2010) , but also Filardo and Genberg (2010) .
28 See Ball and Sheridan (2005) and Filardo and Genberg (2010) . 29 See also Roger (2010) and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010) . 30 See Stone et al. (2009) . 31 See also Posen (2006) . 32 See also Wadhwani (2008) and Roubini (2006) . 33 See, for example, Allsopp (2002) . 34 See also Borio and White (2004) , who suggest that changes in monetary policy, including formal and informal inflation targeting, together with changes in the financial structure have made the financial system more 'elastic', that is more vulnerable to boom and bust, to shocks and crisis. 35 See also Dale (2010) .
